support for a pool to develop treatments and cures for "neglected" diseases, including malaria and cholera. In addition, four parties holding key patent applications related to the development of SARS vaccines expressed their willingness to form a pool. 7 Pools have also been suggested as a means to advance diagnostic testing for breast cancer.
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These plans follow the formation of four successful pools in the IT sector during the 1990s: the MPEG-2 pool, the 3G platform and two DVD pools. 9 In 2001, the value of U.S. goods produced under pooling agreements exceeded $100 billion. 10 Antitrust authorities in the United States favor pools because they "provide procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation."
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Theoretical models of patent pools predict that pools encourage innovation.
Specifically, the prospect of a patent pool increases firms' incentives to invest in R&D because lower risks of litigation and improved licensing schemes increase expected profits for participating firms. 12 The prospect of a patent pool may also increase the 7 Simon et al., "Managing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Intellectual Property Rights." 8 Verbeure et al., "Patent Pools." 9 See e.g., Merges, "Institutions." These pools combine complementary patents that form a technological standard. 10 Clarkson, "Objective Identification." 11 U.S. Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, "Antitrust Guidelines." Regulators have even credited pools with making it possible to produce inventions that would otherwise be blocked by overlapping patent grants: "The pooling of the patents, licensing all patents in the pool collectively, and sharing royalties is not necessarily an antitrust violation. In a case involving blocking patents, such an arrangement is the only reasonable method for making the invention available to the public" (International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, 336 F.2d 723, 729, 9th Cir. 1964) . 12 Lerner and Tirole, "Efficient Patent Pools"; Choi, "Patent Pools"; Gilbert, "Antitrust"; Shapiro, "Navigating the Patent Thicket"; and Merges, "Institutions." Industry experts echo this expectation. For example, one of the founding members of the 2005 radio frequency pool, Stan Drobac,writes that "If you're a licensee, you need to negotiate with five entities to get five licenses, instead of negotiating with 20 to get 20 licenses" (RFID Journal, 10 April, 2008) . Pools that combine complementary patents lower licensing fees for outside firms because they avoid "royalty stacking," when the same product is covered by multiple patents (e.g., Lemley and Shapiro, "Patent Holdup"; Shapiro, "Navigating the Patent Thicket"; and Lerner and Tirole, "Efficient Patent Pools").
speed of innovation: If the number of patents needed to form the pool is limited, firms may race to develop the technologies that are included in the pool.
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A lack of contemporary data, however, has made it difficult to establish these effects empirically. Existing empirical work has sharpened our understanding of institutional characteristics, such as the types of licensing deals that pools offer to nonmembers and rent-sharing agreements among pool members. 14 Nevertheless, there has been little empirical evidence on the effects of patent pools on innovation, mostly because such analyses require much longer time series of data than are available for contemporary pools. Moreover, pools that resolve conflicts about overlapping patents have been extremely rare in recent history.
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This paper uses the example of the first patent pool in U.S. history, the Sewing Machine Combination (1856-1877), to examine whether patent pools encourage innovation. 16 One key advantage of the historical setting is that we can observe an industry from its birth to technical maturity, including more than 30 years of data to analyze the long-term effects of a pool. 17 Another advantage is that the sewing machine pool operated in the complete absence of regulation, which allows us to examine how pools behave when regulators give them free reign.
18 13 Dequiedt and Versaevel, "Patent Pools." 14 Layne-Farrar and Lerner, "Patent Pool Participation"; and Strojwas, Lerner, and Tirole, "Design." 15 Bessen, "Imperfect Property Rights." The only recent example of a pool intended to resolve overlapping patents is the laser surgery pool, which was accused of price-fixing in 1998 (Clark et al., "Patent Pools") . This pool was formed between Summit and VISX, the only two firms with FDA approval to license photorefractive keratectomy (PRK) laser equipment for vision disorders. Based on an FTC antitrust complaint, the two firms eventually made their patents available for non-exclusive licensing to third parties. Bessen, "Imperfect Property Rights," argues that pools of overlapping patent rights are less likely to form because prospective members do not know what share of expected profits will accrue to them. 16 See Thomson, "Path," for a detailed history of the sewing machine industry and, in particular, the industry's importance to the mechanization of shoe manufacturing. 17 See e.g., Clark et al., "Patent Pools"; and Heller and Eisenberg, "Can Patents Deter Innovation?" 18 The first major antitrust case regarding patent pools was E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co. 186, U.S. 70, 91 (1902) . Six different firms had formed the National Harrow to end crippling litigation. Their
In the first step of the analysis, we use data on litigation and on patenting to test the predictions of existing theoretical models of patent pools. Litigation data confirm that pools lowered litigation risks for pool members. 19 They also substantiate the prediction that the prospect of a pool encourages patenting among prospective members.
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Interestingly, however, the data suggest that pool members patented less while the pool was active, and only began to patent more aggressively again after the pool dissolved in 1877. Non-members, which account for the vast majority of patents, appear to have been similarly affected by the creation of the pool; patenting increases immediately after 1856, but declines soon afterwards and remains at low levels until the pool dissolves in 1877. These results are robust to the inclusion of time-and firm-fixed effects, as well as alternative controls for demand and the Civil War.
One potential problem with using patent data to measure innovations is that firms may have used patents strategically to negotiate a more advantageous position in the pool, or to protect themselves from litigation by the pool. 21 To address this issue, we construct an alternative measure of innovation that objectively measures improvements in the performance of sewing machines. Specifically, we use information in company pool combined 85 patents for float spring tooth harrows -a tool to soften top soil for cultivation. National Harrow grew to include 22 firms that covered over 90 percent of the market. Bement was a licensee who sued the pools over the terms of the license, which required licensees to adhere to a uniform price schedule. In 1902, the Supreme Court decided that the pool's licensing terms were lawful, arguing that the benefits it conferred -preventing litigation over patent scope and validity -outweighed the costs that price-fixing created for the industry (Gilbert, "Antitrust, records, including trade cards, advertising, and internal records to measure the number of stitches per minute that a sewing machine was able to perform.
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Data on sewing speeds confirm the results of the patent data: Innovation slowed soon after the pool had been established and did not recover until the pool had been dissolved. Thus, data on annual patenting and innovation suggest that theoretical models should be extended to capture the ex post effects of patent pools on their members, and incorporate effects of pool on other, non-members, which appear to play an important role as drivers of innovation for the entire industry.
The data suggest two ways in which the sewing machine pool may have discouraged innovation. First, by creating a more formidable opponent in court, the pool may have intensified the threat of litigation for outside firms, which lowered expected profits and discouraged innovation. Consistent with this idea, litigation data show that non-members were at a greater risk of being sued while the pool was active; pool members acted as plaintiffs in most of these cases. Second, the existence of a pool that aggressively defended patents may have shifted innovation by non-members towards substitute technologies that were not covered by the pool. In the case of the sewing machine industry, outside firms shifted both patenting and innovation (as measured by firm entry with new models of sewing machines) towards an inferior stitching mechanism, that was not covered by the pool.
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22 Measuring effects on innovation, in addition to effects on patenting, is particularly important if innovations differ systematically from patents. Data on innovations at 19 th century world's fairs indicate that inventors' propensity to patent varies significantly across industries and over time (Moser, "Why Don't Inventors Patent?") . 23 For a detailed analysis of the potential effects of patent pools on the direction of technical change see Lampe and Moser, "Patent Pools and the Direction of Technical Change."
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a short history of the sewing machine industry and its patent pool. Section III describes data on litigation, patents, and sewing speed as an alternative measure of innovation. Section IV and V test predictions of existing theoretical models, and Section VI concludes.
THE EARLY SEWING MACHINE INDUSTRY, 1846-1885
On 10 September 1846, Elias Howe was granted U.S. patent No. 4750 for "Improvements in the Sewing Machine" -the lock-stitch. Although the patent was initially contested, Howe began to charge a hefty license fee ($25, almost 50 percent of the average price) as soon as the court had upheld his patent in 1853.
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The Sewing Machine "Wars" (1846 -1856 Despite its high price, Howe's license did not cover all parts that were needed to build a functional sewing machine. Mirroring the experience of the early 20 th century aircraft industry, manufacturers soon filed suits to assert their rights to different parts of the sewing machine. Litigation during the "sewing machine wars" threatened to stop production and sales. 27 More formally, the sewing machine pool did not incorporate a grantback clause, which requires any additional patents that are granted to pool members after the agreement to be offered to other pool members for licensing without fees (Layne-Farrar and Lerner, "Patent Pool Participation," p. 10). 28 Wheeler and Wilson's four-motion feed was "so superior but few first-class machines are made without it" (Knight, American Mechanical Dictionary, p. 2102) and made the firm "several million dollars" (New York Times, 26 January, 1875). It was renewed twice and expired in 1873. The great feature of the Singer (Bachelder) patent "was the production of a sewing machine in which the cloth to be sewn is supported horizontally, and is fed through the machine perpetually. His machine was the first sewing machine in which the cloth was supported horizontally and advanced by an automatic feed of any kind. It is scarcely possible to estimate sufficiently the importance of such an invention in the art of sewing by machinery" (Potter et al. v. Braunsdorf, F. Cas. 1132 1869 Knight, American Mechanical Dictionary, p. 2102 . Singer had purchased this patent from John Bachelder (Cooper, Sewing Machine, p. 23 In fact, Elias Howe, who did not produce sewing machines, demanded that the pool patents should be licensed to at least 24 licensed manufacturers at any given point in time. 32 Once outside firms had bought a license, the pool placed no restrictions; most importantly, licensees were able to set prices without intervention by the pool.
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The pool agreement, however, stipulated that part of the license fee was to be set aside to support its litigation fund, which was to be maintained above $10,000, 
THE DATA
To examine the pool's effects on innovation, we have constructed a rich new data set, which combines annual data on patents by pool members, licensees and other nonmembers with data on improvements in sewing speeds as an objectively quantifiable measure of innovation. Legal records on litigation, as well as alternative measures for changes in the demand for sewing machines complement these data.
Sewing Machine Patents by Pool Members, Licensees, and Other Firms
To measure changes in inventive activity over time, we count the number of U.S. Entry and exit dates are available for 135 of these firms, nearly 80 percent; few companies, however, survived for more than ten years. 34 Using the Consumer Price Index, $10,000 in 1856 is worth $252,240.88. Other indicators place the value of the litigation fund between $191, 841 and $34, 443, 798 (Williamson, "Six Ways") . 35 Knight's Mechanical Dictionary is a useful complement to the records of the United States Patent Office because Knight divides sewing machine patents for 1842 and 1874 into nine functional categories: (1) sewing machines making the chain-stitch, (2) sewing machines making the lock-stitch, (3) sewing machines for sewing leather, (4) feeding devices, (5) button-hole sewing, (6) miscellaneous parts, (7) attachments, (8) tables and stands, and (9) motors. We exclude data for " To measure the timing of inventions, we record the grant dates for all patents;
filing dates, as an alternative measure, are only available after 1873.
37

Improvements in Sewing Speed
One potential problem with using patents as a measure of innovation is that inventors may use patents strategically, so that changes in patenting do not accurately reflect changes in innovation. For example, prospective pool members may patent existing innovations more aggressively prior to the pool because they want to improve their negotiating position relative to other members. Similarly, non-members may patent more aggressively after the pool has formed to protect themselves from litigation.
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To address this issue, we construct an alternative measure of innovation that quantifies improvements in the performance of sewing machines for member and nonmember machines. Specifically, we examine changes in the speed of sewing machines, as measured by the number of stitches that a machine can perform within one minute.
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37 Grants typically occurred six months to a year after an inventor applied for a patent (e.g., Thomson, "Learning by Selling," p. 435), depending on the complexity of applications and the workload of examiners (Popp et al., "Time in Purgatory") . To measure this lag for 19 th -century sewing machines, we compared application and grant dates for a random sample of 100 sewing machine patents between 1873 and 1875. In this sample the average patent was granted roughly six months (140 days) after the application. These data corroborate the standard assumption that sewing machine patents were issued about six months after the application date (e.g,, Thomson, "Learning by Selling," p. 435). 38 See, e.g. Hall and Ziedonis, "Patent Paradox"; and Shapiro, "Navigating the Patent Thicket." 39 A major benefit of this measure is that speed can be quantified objectively. In comparison, alternative measures, such as the number of known stitch types, would be significantly more subjective. Knights Mechanical Dictionary, lists 68 distinct stitch types in 1874 (Knight, American Mechanical Dictionary, pp. We , but it is difficult to establish how distinct, or useful these stitches are from each other. For example, Knight's data include several embroidery stitches, but these stitches may not be as distinct from each other (or as useful) as two stitches to work with leather versus cloth. Because the type of a stitch that a sewing machine performs influences its sewing speed, we focus on lockstitch machines, which were known to produce the most durable stitch. Machines producing single thread stitches, such as Wilcox and Gibbs chain stitch machines were generally faster than lock-stitch machines, but a single stitch proved so much less durable that all but a few firms eventually abandoned it (James, Upholstery Tips, p. 86). Among the pool members, Singer and Wheeler & Wilson had focused on lockstitch machines from the start (Bays, Encyclopedia), while Grover & Baker manufactured double thread chain-stitch machines until 1875, when they sold to a competitor who switched production to lock-stitch machines (Depew, One Hundred Years, p. 528) . Improvements in the design of shuttles and the adoption of cranks in drive mechanisms (instead of springs and cams) are the most likely sources of improvements in the speed of sewing (Thomson, Path, p. 148) . Although Singer introduced a machine with an attached electric motor in 1889, the foot-powered treadle remained the most effective drive mechanism throughout the 19th century (Depew, One Hundred Years, p. 534) . 40 A special report in the Thirteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor (Hand and Machine Labor), contains comparisons of sewing machine and hand productivity for 1895. Unfortunately, these data cannot be linked to earlier years or specific sewing machines. 41 We search for cases that include the terms "sewing machine" and "patent infringement." Broader search terms, such as "patent" or "sewing," did not produce additional cases. In addition, patent data, especially when electronically collected, are subject to measurement error. For example, optical character recognition cannot always distinguish the 19 th -century script for letters R from B, P from F, and U from J. To address this issue, we hand-checked random samples of the data and replicated every search with the corresponding misspelled letters (e.g., "Singee" for Singer).
Measures for the Intensity of the Civil War and Changes in Demand
Across industries, disruptions as a result of the Civil War (1861 to 1865) may have discouraged innovation. For the sewing machine industry, however, the war may have also encouraged innovation, as it increased demand for machine-made uniforms.
Before 1861 the U.S. Army manufactured its own uniforms and was reluctant to experiment with machine-made clothing, fearing that the product would be inadequate for combat duty, especially under rough frontier conditions. The sewing machine was initially confined, therefore, to stitching caps and chevrons. With the outbreak of war, the contracts signed for military clothing did not specify a method of manufacture. Suppliers soon turned increasingly to machine-made apparel to assure standard quality and to meet contract deadlines (Whitten and Whitten, Handbook, .
In addition to increasing its demand for machine-made clothing, the war department placed direct orders for machines:
the Civil War brought a demand by the War Department for a million uniforms. The government contracted for thousands of sewing machines; these were loaned free to sewing circles which worked on the making of uniforms (Crow, Great American Customer, p. 205) . 45 Small sewing machine manufacturers that are missing from the data produced between 500 and 1000 firms over their lifetime (Bays, Encyclopedia) . As an alternative check of the data, we also examined city directories for Philadelphia (1850 , 1855 , 1860 , 1870 , 1880 ) and New York (1850 , 1851 , 1860 , 1869 , 1880 Figure 4) . 47 Most of our estimations focus on increases in the number of Union soldiers; Confederate uniforms were rarely machine-stitched and both sides reused uniforms. 48 Results, however, are robust to alternative measures of the intensity of the war, including the number of Confederate soldiers.
To control for alternative sources of changes in demand, we include data on population growth and real GDP, which serve as proxies for demand by individual families.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Did the Pool Reduce Litigation?
Theoretical models of patent pools predict that pools lower the threat of litigation for their members. 50 In the case of the sewing machine, the pool's prospective members had engaged in crippling litigation, which was ended by the pool. independently initiated another 9 legal disputes. Forty-nine of these 64 cases were directed at outside firms ( Figure 6 ). Thus, the pool may have increased litigation risks for outside firms even as it lowered such risks for its members.
Did the Pool Encourage its Members to Patent More?
The most central prediction of the theoretical literature, however, is that patent pools encourage innovation by increasing expected profits for member firms and whether patenting increased in the years leading up to the pool and continued at a higher level while the pool was active. While theoretical analyses focus on effects on pool members, we also extend the analysis to include effects on other firms, which accounted for the majority of patents and improvements.
If the prospect of a pool encourages a patent race among prospective members, firms that succeed in joining the pool should have a larger number of patents in the years leading up to the pool. These predictions are borne out in the data; in 1855, three members were granted a total of 10 patents, compared with an average of less than three 
Did the Pool Encourage Outside Firms to Patent More?
57 Dequiedt and Versaevel, "Patent Pools." 58 Singer purchased its key patent for the horizontal work surface from Bachelder (Cooper, Sewing Machine, p. 23) .
In contrast to patents by members, patents by outside firms spiked after the pool had been established (Figure 2 ). Annual patents jump from 29 patents in 1856 to more than 100 patents in 1858. 59 Similar to the case of member patents, this spike in patenting may, however, represent a strategic response to a heightened threat of litigation with a more powerful opponent, rather than a true increase in innovation.
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Patenting by non-members began to decline only two years after the pool had formed. By 1862, annual patents had fallen to 21 patents per year, below pre-pool levels.
Patenting recovered after the Civil War increased demand for sewing machines (to 150 patents in 1873). After this peak, patenting declined again until the pool dissolved in 1877. By 1880, only three years after the pool dissolved, patenting began to rise again, increasing to nearly 300 patents in 1882.
Comparing sewing machine patents with aggregate counts of U.S. patents also indicates that the pool discouraged patenting. An initial increase of sewing machines to 3 percent of all U.S. patents in 1858 had eroded to less than 1 percent by 1866 (Figure 3 ).
Sewing machine patents recovered after the pool dissolved, to 2 percent of all U.S. patents in 1882. Thus, comparisons with total patent counts confirm the results above that the pool discouraged patenting by both members and other firms.
Difference-in-Differences Estimation
To examine the patent data more systematically, we estimate difference-indifferences regressions that compare annual patents by pool members relative to other 59 Patenting rates in the late 1850s may be an overestimate relative to the early 1850s, when patent solicitors successfully lobbied for the removal of examiners whom they thought to be too strict in assessing novelty. Post ("Liberalizers," p. 52) argues that the share of patent applications that were granted increased as a result of this change; grant rates increased from 32 percent in 1853 to 67 percent in 1859. 60 See e.g., Shapiro, "Navigating the Patent Thicket"; and The coefficient PMP on the interaction Pool Member * Pool is our difference-indifferences estimator; it measures the increase in patenting by pool members relative to other firms. Under the assumption that omitted time-varying effects are uncorrelated with pool membership this coefficient can be interpreted as the causal effect of the pool:
If PMP is positive and statistically different from zero, the pool encouraged members to patent more. Similarly, licensees may have patented more while the pool was active if they benefitted from reductions in license fees and transaction costs.
We also control for Firm Age as a characteristic that may affect patenting regardless of the pool. Specifically, younger firms may patent more because they are more likely to be based on novel technologies. Alternatively, older firms may patent more because they are more established and familiar with the patent system. 62 61 As a result some of our untreated years were actually partially treated by the pool, so that we may underestimate the real effect of the pool. We miss two months of pool activity in 1856, because the pool was founded in October 1856, and four months in 1877, because the pool dissolved in May 1877. 62 For sewing machines models between 1853 and 1882, sales have been found to encourage technological change (Thomson, "Learning by Selling"). In our sample, sales data are available for 30 firms that were licensed by the pool between 1867 and 1876 (20 percent of all firms, yielding a total of 163 observations).
In this subsample of the data, the coefficient of correlation between annual sales and annual patents is 0.185. The coefficient is 0.192 assuming a two year grant lag and 0.153 assuming a one year grant lag.
To account for unobservable factors that may influence patenting we include annual and firm fixed effects ( t and i ). For example, the dismissal of strict examiners in the early 1850s or changes in the demand for sewing machines may help to increase the annual number of patents, independently of the pool. Similarly, certain firms may patent more because they are more creative regardless of age or the existence of a pool.
Regression results confirm that members patented less while the pool was active.
Estimates for PMP indicate that members produced an average of 1.6 fewer patents per year while the pool was active (Table 1, significant at 5 percent). In comparison, across all years, pool members produced between 2.0 and 2.2 more patents per year. Additional regressions that estimate year-specific treatment effects indicate that members generated between 0.8 and 2.3 fewer patents in the last ten years of the pool compared with the preand post-pool period.
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The data also yield only limited evidence that the pool encouraged licensees to patent more. Licensees produced up to 0.2 additional patents per year than other firms, but this effect is not statistically significant (Table 1, I and III) . Interactions between Licensees and Pool are never statistically significant. Another interesting result from the data is that, all else equal, younger sewing machine manufacturers patented more: A 1 percent decrease in age adds about 0.2 patents per year (Table 1 , IV, significant at 5 percent).
How did the Civil War Affect Patenting?
63 Coefficients are negative for all 20 years when the pool was active (1857-76), and they are significant at the 5 percent level for 12 of these years: 1857, 1860, 1863, 1865 to 68, and 1871 to 75.
Alternative specifications control for the Civil War and other factors that may have influenced demand. Specifically, we examine the potential impact of increases in the size of the Union Army, real GDP, and population. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
Singer and other pool members benefitted disproportionately from increases in the demand of sewing machines, with Singer selling "tens of thousands machines." 64 To identify these effects, we estimate interaction terms between firms' affiliation to the pool (distinguishing members and licensees) and measures for the intensity of the Civil War.
To account that demand effects may operate with a lag, we also include one-year lagged increases in the size of the Union Army. 65 Linear time trends capture changes in patenting over time that may be independent of the pool.
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(2 Regression results from this alternative specification confirm results of regressions with time fixed effects that the pool discouraged its members from patenting.
Across all years, members produced about 2 additional patents per year compared with other firms (at 1 percent significance). In comparison, members produced 1.6 fewer patents per year while the pool was actively (at 1 percent significance, Table 2 ).
Similar to regressions with time and firm fixed effects, regressions with controls for specific demand factors yield no significant evidence that licensees patented more while the pool was active or in response to lower license fees. In fact, increases in nonmember license fees are positively correlated with increases in the number of licensee patents per year. Thus, because license fees might be endogenous to patenting, we exclude license fees and focus on alternative controls (Table 2, II-V) .
Interestingly, the data indicate that the Civil War discouraged innovation in the sewing machine industry, despite its effects on demand. For every 10,000 increase in the number of Union Army soldiers, the average non-member firm produced between 0.004 and 0.006 fewer patents per year (at 1 percent significance, Table 2 , II-V). Thus, the data suggest that the disruptions caused by the war outweighed its positive demand effects for outside firms. Consistent with the narrative evidence, however, the Civil War appears to have encouraged patenting by pool members. For every 10,000 increase in Union Army soldiers, pool members produced 0.01 additional patents per year (at 10 percent significance, Table 2 ).
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To account for the large number of zeros in the dependent variable we repeat the analysis as Poisson and negative binomial regressions. 68 All key results are robust to this alternative specification. Across the entire sample, pool members patented more than other firms (producing between 5 and 7 times as many patents per year, at 1 percent significance, Table 3 ). The coefficient on the interaction Pool Member i * Pool t indicates that the pool reduced the number of member patents by 50 to 57 percent (at 5 percent 67 The data suggest that the effect was strongest in the same year, perhaps because the war department demanded uniforms before new soldiers would join the war. Our main results are robust to including absolute numbers of Union Army soldiers rather than changes in the number of soldiers. 68 In these regressions, patents per year, p it , is assumed to be an exponential function of firm specific characteristics, X it , and a series of controls, it : E[p it |X it ]=exp(X it + t ) where i indexes the firm and t indexes the year. Negative binomial and Poisson regressions take into account the fact that the distribution of patents is skewed towards zero; negative binomial regressions also allow the variance of the dependent variable to be larger than its mean. In our data set, the mean number of patents per year is 0.43 and the variance is 1.15. This suggests that a negative binomial model is preferred to a Poisson model. significance, Table 3 ). Similar to OLS, Poisson and negative binomial regressions yield no evidence that licensees patented more. 69 The coefficient on Union Army t * Pool Member i is significant at 5 percent confirming OLS results and narrative evidence suggesting that the war encouraged pool members to patent more (Tables 3 and 4) .
Did the Pool Encourage Technical Progress?
Two key findings of the patent data suggest that the pool may have encouraged changes in strategic patenting rather than innovation. First, the increase in member patents immediately preceding the pool suggests that prospective members may have patented existing innovations more aggressively to strengthen their bargaining position relative to other members. 70 Second, the spike in patenting for non-member firms immediately after the creation of the pool may represent a strategic response by nonmembers to a heightened threat of litigation.
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To separate changes in strategic patenting from changes in innovation, we examine data on sewing speeds as an objectively quantifiable measure of performance.
Data on sewing speeds confirm that the pool slowed rather than encouraged rates of innovation ( Figure 5 ). From 1845 until 1856, the maximum number of stitches that a sewing machine could perform increased from 200 to 2,000 stitches per minute. As soon as the pool had been established, innovation appears to have come to a halt, and sewing speeds stayed roughly constant for the duration of the pool. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has used the example of the 19 th century sewing machine industry to examine empirically whether patent pools encourage innovation. Our data broadly confirm theoretical predictions that patent pools lower litigation risks for pool members and that the prospect of a patent pool encourages prospective members to patent more.
In contrast to theoretical predictions, however, pool members began to patent less as soon as the pool had been established. For example, difference-in-difference estimates indicate that pool members patented less while the pool was active both relative to the pre-and post-pool period and compared with other manufacturers. Similarly, the share of 72 Improvements in shuttles and the adoption of cranks in drive mechanisms (replacing springs and cams) are the most likely sources of improvements in sewing speeds (Thomson, Path, p. 148) . Electrification sets in after the sample period; although Singer introduced a machine with an attached electric motor in 1889, the foot-powered treadle remained the most effective drive mechanism throughout the 19th century (Depew, One Hundred Years, p. 534) . Basic least square estimations confirm that improvements in speed slowed during the pool years. Specifically, we estimate least squares regressions of stitches-per-minute with a linear time trend and the Pool variable as explanatory variable. In such regressions, the coefficient on Pool is negative but not statistically significant. As an additional robustness check, we drop observations that record the fastest speed during the pool years (2,000 per minute); these regressions also confirm that improvements in the speed of sewing machines decelerated as long as the pool was active. 73 In comparison, modern industrial lock-stitch machines sew at speeds of 6,000 stitches per minute. See McGrath and Blachford, "Gale Encyclopedia, " p. 3, 350. 74 Crow, Great American Customer, p. 205. sewing machine inventions in the U.S. patent data declined during the pool and recovered only after the pool had been dissolved.
We are also able to improve existing studies of pools by extending the analysis to include outside firms, which account for the majority of innovations in the sewing machine industry. These data suggest that the pool discouraged patenting by outside firms and that it had at best insignificant positive effects on patenting by licensees.
One limitation of using patent data as a measure of innovation is that observed changes in patenting may reflect firms' strategic response, for example to threats of litigation, rather than true changes in innovation. In the case of the sewing machine To separate strategic effects from increases in innovation, we constructed an alternative data set of objectively measurable improvements in the performance of sewing machines (stitches per minute). These data confirm that innovation slowed while the pool was active and only began to accelerate again after the pool dissolved in 1876.
Interestingly, significant increases in the demand for sewing machines as a result of the Civil War had only minimal effects on the sewing machine industry as a whole, although they appear to have encouraged patenting by pool members. 
